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1Abstract
Over the past decade several countries, including the US, have in-
troduced or redesigned legislation that confers priority in bankruptcy
upon all or some bank deposits. We argue that in the presence of
contracting costs such rules can increase e¢ciency. We …rst show in
a private information model that a borrower can reduce overall costs
of …nance by letting informationally heterogeneous lenders choose be-
tween junior and senior debt. In particular, we …nd that debt priorities
reduce socially wasteful information gathering by investors. We then
argue why, particularly in banking, legal standardization of debt prior-
ities may be superior to bilateral private arrangements.
21 Introduction
One of the earliest tools used to protect the depositors of a failing bank from
losses was priority in bankruptcy. However, for decades, this tool was almost
forgotten. Only recently, priority regulation has made a kind of revival.
Several countries have enacted new, or re-enforced existing, legislation on
deposit priority. In the US, under the term “depositor preference”, priority in
bankruptcy was granted to all deposits in 1993. In Switzerland, long existing
deposit priorities were updated and extended in 1997. Several emerging
market countries, such as Hong-Kong, Malaysia, and Argentina, recently
introduced deposit priority rules.
This renewed interest in priority rules re‡ects some disappointment with
respect to deposit insurance. After 1980, several countries experienced severe
banking problems that were at least partially attributed to excessive deposit
insurance. The high cost to tax-payers kindled political interest in more
incentive-compatible measures to protect the depositors of a failed institu-
tion. Deposit priority looked like a natural candidate: It protects depositors
but preserves market discipline, since depositors are insured by junior lenders
to the same bank, rather than by a third party such as an insurance fund or
the taxpayer.
Several observers have evenproposed aregulatory minimumto the amount
of junior, or subordinated, debt of banks.1 While these authors stress the
1See e.g. Benston & al. (1986), pp. 179, 193; White (1991), p. 237; Evano¤ (1992). A
maximum risk spread on subordinated debt is proposed by Calomiris (1999). For a text-
book discussion of subordinated debt proposals see Dewatripont & Tirole (1994), section
3potential of subordinated bank debt to protect depositors and to support
market discipline, bank supervisors have been reluctant to give subordinated
debt a more prominent role. Under the Basle Capital Standards, only a
limited amount of subordinated debt is eligible for so-called “supplementary
capital”, as many supervisors consider it an inferior form of capital compared
to equity.
Notwithstanding important deposit priority legislation and the political
debate on subordinated debt, academic economists have devoted relatively
little e¤ort to the analysis of such rules. Some critics thus warn against “the
dangers of enacting important legislation ... without exploring longer run
implications” (Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 1996). This article
tries to contribute to a better understanding of such rules.
Legal priority rules can be viewed from two sides. From one side, they
are potentially costly government interventions: By giving priority to some
claims, the legislator restricts contracting options of private parties and may
prevent them from reaching optimal arrangements. From the other side, legal
priority rules are a substitute for private covenants that would be costly to
write in the presence of transaction costs. It might be cheaper to de…ne
priority in the law than in numerous private contracts. As we will set out
below, legal standardization of priorities may be particularly relevant for
banks with their large number of unsophisticated depositors.
Proponents of this “transaction cost view” of standardized priority rules
13.3.1. An excellent review of di¤erent proposals can be found in Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 1999.
4should be able to show that debt priorities can be features of optimal con-
tracts in the …rst place. This is not a trivial task. From the Modigliani &
Miller (1958, 1963) irrelevance theorems it follows that in perfect markets a
…rm is not able to reduce its aggregate cost of …nance by de…ning a partic-
ular hierarchy among various claims. Any reduction in interest payments to
senior lenders should be exactly outweighed by a corresponding increase in
interest payments to junior lenders.
An early discussion of debt priority rules, from which our model is in-
spired, can be found in Jackson & Kronman (1979) (J&K). The authors
explain the use of priorities by individual di¤erences in lenders’ costs or in-
centives to monitor a borrower. Priority rules help to focuse monitoring
incentives on lenders, for whom monitoring is relatively cheap. J&K give
three reasons for di¤erences in monitoring cost:
1. Per-dollar monitoring costs fall with the size of a loan.
2. The incentive to monitor rises with the duration of a loan.
3. Some lenders may have comparative advantages in monitoring services.
While J&K provide a rather complete and insightful statement of what
one may call the “monitoring hypothesis” of debt priorities, they do not o¤er
a formal model. The present article tries to …ll this gap. In the spirit of J&K,
we will try to show how debt priorities can reduce duplication of monitoring
e¤orts. In contrast to J&K, we abstract from di¤erences in size and duration
of loans and rather build on investor heterogeneity as a cause for di¤erences
5in monitoring cost. We go beyond J&K by explaining simultaneously the
choice of contracts, the value of information, and the level of monitoring.
Heterogeneity of investors and monitoring incentives are also at the heart
of Calomiris & Kahn (1991). Their model, like our own, is focused on bank
deposits. Monitoring depositors of a bank can attain implicit priority over
non-monitors, as they are …rst in line to withdraw demand deposits following
bad news. However, the authors do not explicitly model deposit priorities,
and the amount of monitoring is imposed on, rather than explained in their
model. We are not aware of any other article dealing with priority of bank
deposits.2 An article that also uses endogenous information expenditure is
Winton (1995), where dual class debt helps prevent duplication of ex post
veri…cation of a borrower’s returns by several lenders.
While these explanations of priorities assume some heterogeneity among
investors, several explanations of priority choice build on heterogeneity of
borrowers: In Diamond (1993) short-term debt can only be re…nanced in bad
times if it is senior to long-term debt. In Stulz & Johnson (1985) and in Hart
& Moore (1993), debt priorities provide optimal incentives to shareholders
and to managers.3 In Barclay & Smith (1995) borrowers signal their earnings
2Fama (1985), Gorton & Kahn (1993), Welch (1995), Hege (1997), and Repullo &
Suarez (1998) explain the priority class of debt held by banks (by logic of banks’ bargaining
power in renegotiation).
3One implication of these models is that an insolvent debtor should be able to raise
senior debt, if this allows her to …nance positive net present value projects. Interestingly,
some bankruptcy codes provide for this possibility: Art. 310 of Swiss Debt Enforcement
and Bankruptcy Law, e.g., states that in the case of a composition agreement obligations
6prospects by issuing junior or senior debt. In Scott (1977) priority to existing
creditors protects these against (junior) legal damages.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 brie‡y describes existing
deposit priority rules in di¤erent countries. In section 3 we present a model
of debt priorities as features of optimal contracts under costly monitoring.
In section 4 we state some reasons why priority rules seem particularly im-
portant for bank liabilities, and why they are often standardized in the law.
Conclusions are presented in section 5.
2 Deposit priority rules in di¤erent countries
In the US, so-called “depositor preference” was introduced for all banks in-
sured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (fdic) in 1993.4 Prior
to the introduction of depositor preference on a federal level in 1993, similar
rules had already been in place in 27 states (see Osterberg, 1996). Some had
been introduced as early as 1909 (Nebraska), the latest in 1993 (Missouri).
Under depositor preference all deposits are senior to non-deposit liabilities.
While depositor preference tends tofavour the holders of non-insured deposits
(i.e. deposits exceeding 100,000 US$), its main bene…ciary was intended to
be the fdic. When paying out depositors of a failed bank, the fdic acquires
their claims against the bank, including their priority status. This means,
incurred during the moratorium with the commissioner’s consent bind the estate. Such
obligations are thus senior to all claims established prior to the composition agreement.
4See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of August 10, 1993, P.L. 103-66, sec. 3001;
for a summary and brief comment see Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (1996).
7ceteris paribus, a lower expected loss to the insurer than in the absence of
depositor preference.
In Switzerland, bankruptcy priority (“privilège en cas de faillite”, “Kon-
kursprivileg”) for savings deposits was introduced as part of the Federal Act
on Banks and Savings Banks of 1934. Before that, several Cantons (i.e.
states) used collateral provisions to e¤ectively grant priority to savings de-
posits. Under the present rules, savings deposits (and some similar deposits)
up to an aggregate amount of 30,000 Sfr. (approximately 20,000 US$) per
depositor are senior to all other deposits or liabilities.5 In Switzerland there
is no o¢cial deposit insurance. Yet, under a private agreement within the
Swiss Bankers Association (sba), banks mutually guarantee deposits that
have priority in bankruptcy. Like the fdic in the US, the sba acquires
depositors’ priority claims when it pays out depositors.
Over the past decade, priority rules have been introduced in a number
of emerging market countries. In Hong-Kong, deposits up to 100,000 HK$
(about 60,000 US$) are senior to all other bank liabilities.6 This provision
was introduced as an alternative to deposit insurance. In Malaysia, domestic
5According to Article 15, section 2, Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks. The
ceiling for priority laid down in this article was raised on two occasions (1971, 1997)
to keep pace with nominal growth of deposits. Only banks (i.e. licensed institutions)
are allowed to o¤er liabilities characterized by the term “saving”. Savings deposits have
traditionally been the most common bank account. They are generally perceived as the
typical account for unsophisticated investors.
6Section 265 (db) of the Hong-Kong Companies Ordinance of 1996
8deposits have a priority claim against domestic assets of a bank.7 In Ar-
gentina, deposits are subject to several priority provisions;8 like in the US,
the national deposit insurance fund (segesa) acquires the priority status
of deposits it pays out.9 Several other countries have deposit priority rules,
either in connection with deposit insurance, like Chile and Peru, or without,
like Australia, Russia and Mongolia.
3 A monitoring model of debt priorities
3.1 Assumptions
A risk-neutral monopolist banker has access to a linear project with an un-
certain, but observable return. The project has two outcomes: “success” and




with Y > Y . The
two possible outcomes have prior probability p ¸ 0:5 and (1 ¡ p), respec-
tively. The banker has no wealth of her own; she tries to …nance the project
by borrowing from a large number of investors. As in reality, the banker
must publicly announce what types of contracts she will o¤er, before she can
raise any money. Investors can then accept one of the contracts (“make a de-
posit”) or buy a risk-less asset with a per dollar return R > Y .10 An investor
who accepts a bank contract is called a “depositor”. The banker invests the
7Section 81 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) of 1989.
8Articles 49e and 53 of the Law on Financial Institutions (no. 21.526)
9Articles 12d, and 13 to 17, Decrees no. 540/96 and 1292/96.
10Investors who are indi¤erent are assumed to choose the alternative preferred by the
banker.
9funds she gets, and receives the returns from the project. Depositors get
contractual payments. When the project has failed, an authority veri…es the
structure of deposits to ensure that priority rules are respected.
Investors are risk-neutral and together they have one dollar. Before they
take a lending decision (but after available contracts have been announced),
investors can observe a costly but imperfect signal on project returns. The
signal is the same for all investors who get it. Investors are completely iden-
ti…ed by their “type”, i.e. by their individual (deadweight) costs of observing
the signal. There is a continuum of investors, with information cost s uni-




. The banker gets the signal for
free. While the signal is observable to those who incur the necessary cost,
it cannot be veri…ed. Neither type nor the state of knowledge of investors
are observable. Investors cannot communicate about received signals. Their
actions (lending decisions) are only observable to the banker.11 All other
parameters, including the distribution of s, are publicly known.
Figure 1 illustrates the time structure of the model. In t=0 agents learn all
publicly known parameters, and the banker announces the menu of available
contracts. In t=1 agents can get the signal (from nature). In t=2, investors
accept a bank contract or buy the riskless asset. The banker invests borrowed
funds in the project.12 In t=3, the outcome of the project (success or failure)
is revealed, and pay-o¤s are shared according to contracts.
11Through veri…cation after failure, the deposit structure becomes known and may reveal
some ex post information on the signal.
12It can be shown that the banker will not invest in the riskless asset.
10[Figure 1 about here]
The signal can take two values, g, and b, for “good” and “bad”. A good
signal updates the chances of success from p to q > p and of failure from
(1 ¡ p) to (1 ¡ q); after a bad signal, the odds are reversed. The signal tells
the investor from which of two lotteries Y is drawn. The probabilities q and
(1 ¡ q) can be interpreted as the probabilities that the signal will be right,
or wrong, respectively.13
The odds of receiving the signal g or b, henceforth u and (1 ¡ u), follow
from the prior and posterior probabilities p and q. Solving
p = uq + (1 ¡ u)(1 ¡ q), and 1 ¡ p = u(1 ¡ q) + (1 ¡ u)q,
for u and (1 ¡ u) yield
u =
q + p ¡ 1
2q ¡ 1
, and 1 ¡ u =
q ¡ p
2q ¡ 1
We will denote the fraction of investors who choose to acquire the signal by
k (0 · k · 1). A rational investor will buy the signal if its value exceeds its
cost. If the value of the signal (which depends on the contract menu o¤ered
by the banker) is V , all investors with information cost s · V buy the signal.
Therefore k = V=S
³
if 0 · V · S
´
and the total amount spent on the signal
is kV=2 = V 2=2S.





[R ¡ Y ]. (1)
13A signal with the same structure is used in Dow & Rossiensky 1998.
11We will denote a menu of n contracts by C =fc1;:::;cng. Each contract
speci…es promised payments to depositors in veri…able states of nature. Such
states are: (1.) project outcome (success or failure), and, in case of failure,
(2.) the structure of deposits, Á = ff1;:::;fng, where fi is the fraction of
depositors (not of potential investors) holding contract ci to total depositors.
If we denote promised payments in case of success by D, and in case of failure
by M (Á), contract ci can be written as
c
i = fD;M (Á)g.
For expositional reasons we analyze contracts for the benchmark case in
which the project, in expected terms, just breaks even when a bad signal has
been observed. I.e. we assume that
(1 ¡ q)Y + qY = R. (2)
We will later relax this assumption to examine which contracts would be





3.2 The social optimum
The social planner maximizes the sum of expected returns from optimum
investment after a good and a bad signal, minus the aggregate cost of the




qY + (1 ¡ q)Y
i




(1 ¡ q)Y + qY
i







12where IY g and IRg are total investmentin the project, and in the riskless asset,
respectively, when the signal is good; while IY b and IRb are the analogous
expressions when the signal is bad. As qY + (1 ¡ q)Y > R and (1 ¡ q)Y +
qY = R, the planner would invest all resources in the project after a good
signal and be indi¤erent after a bad one. Individual monitoring is purely
dissipative. The social optimum is characterized by
I
¤
Y g = 1, I
¤
Rg = 0; k
¤ = 0.
The social optimum can be achieved if the banker can observe investors’
types. In this symmetric information case she would o¤er individualized
contracts that pay c(s) = fD(s);M (s)g to an investor with signal cost s.14
The banker would maximize pro…ts by choosing D(s) and M (s) to:
1. Provide uninformed investors with an expected income of R. Contracts
would thus satisfy
pD(s) + (1 ¡ p)M (s) = R. (4)
2. Set the value of information for each investor equal to his signal cost
s. Given that (4) holds, investors accept their contract if they have a
good or no signal, but not with a bad signal. The value of the signal is
thus equal to the probability that the signal will be bad (and prevent
the investor from buying the contract) times the amount of money the
14All contracts are held by an identical (in…nitesimally small) fraction f of depositors.
Therefore Á does not appear in contracts.
13investor expects to save by buying the riskless asset rather than the
bank contract when the signal is bad. Contracts therefore satisfy the
information constraint
s = (1 ¡ u)[R ¡ (1 ¡ q)D(s) ¡ qM (s)]. (5)
Under (4) and (5), investors would just accept their tailor-made contracts
and lend to the bank without gathering the signal. The social optimum would
be implemented.
What would optimal individual contracts look like? Solving (4) and (5)
for D(s) and M (s) yields


















the depositor with lowest information cost (0) and the one with highest in-
formation cost (S), respectively, get contracts
c










14Remarkably, investors with high information costs get relatively risky con-
tracts, while investors with low information costs are o¤ered relatively safe
contracts. This is because under observable information cost the banker can
load each investor with the maximum amount of risk he is willing to bear
without acquiring the signal.15
It is easy to see that this contract structure would indeed maximize the
banker’s pro…t. From each contract, the banker keeps pay-o¤s
n
Y ¡ D(s);Y ¡ M (s)
o
. (10)
As the terms in (s) in (6)(7) or in (10) disappear with integration, investors
get an expected income of R, while the banker gets an expected total pro…t
of
P = pY + (1 ¡ p)Y ¡ R. (11)
Due to her market power, the banker thus reaps the whole net return of the
project.
3.3 The banker’s problem under asymmetric informa-
tion
Under asymmetric information, a pro…t-maximizing banker will not imple-
ment the social optimum. If the bank were to announce the …rst best contract
scheme given by (6) and (7), investors with low information cost would mis-
represent their type. The investor with information cost of s = 0, to take
15For the social optimum in the example given in the text being implementable without
negative payments to any agent, model parameters must satisfy Y ¸ 1
2
1+p
p R, and Y ¸ 1
2R.
15an extreme case, instead of staying uninformed and accepting the riskless
contract described in (8) would acquire the signal and, in case of good news,
buy the risky contract designed for the investor with highest information
cost described in (9). His expected return in the example above would be
Rq=p > R. An equilibrium that fully separates investor types does not exist
when the banker cannot observe investors’ types.
The optimal menu of contracts maximizes the banker’s expected pro…ts
across signals. Let Ii
Y g (C) denote the amount the bank can invest from the
sale of contract ci 2 C after a good signal and Ii
Y b (C) the respective amount
when the signal is bad. For any contract and signal, the total amount of
investment in the project is equal to IY =
P
I, while investment in the
riskless asset is IR = 1 ¡
P








































where Ág and Áb are the structure of deposits after a good and a bad signal,
respectively.
To …nd the best contract scheme, the banker has to decide what groups
of investors (informed, uninformed) she should borrow from. Given any
contract parameters, the banker would like to borrow as much as possible.
Due to her limited liability, she can never lose from borrowing. Even when
the signal is bad, borrowing and investing yield a positive expected pro…t.
This does not mean that the banker should choose contracts to attract
all possible groups of investors. The banker has four di¤erent options: She
16can o¤er contract menus that appeal to (1.) no investor, (2.) only investors
with a good signal, (3.) investors with a good signal and such with no signal,
(4.) all investors, whatever their signal. We will examine in section 3.7 below
which strategy is preferable under which model parameters. Before we can
do so, we have to examine optimal contracts for each possible case. As the
…rst and the last case are not interesting, we focus on the two intermediate
strategies which are distinguished by the role of uninformed investors. We
will …rst examine the (more interesting) case in which the banker does borrow
from such investors.
3.4 The single contract
Borrowing from informed and from uninformed investors, the banker is faced
with two potential groups of lenders. She can try to implement a pooling or a
separating equilibrium. In this section, we examine the properties of a pool-
ing equilibrium. In a pooling equilibrium, the banker o¤ers the same contract
to all investors. The contract menu has one single item c = fD, Mg. The
contractual payment after failure, M, does not depend on Á, the structure of
depositors: there is only one contract, and the fraction of depositors (not of
investors) holding it is equal to one.
The banker chooses the elements of c in order to maximize her pro…ts,
given privately optimal behaviour of investors. She has to take into account
a number of constraints.
Optimal information constraint
17An investor wants to receive the signal if its value exceeds his individual
cost s. The value of the signal (the expected return to an informed investor
minus the expected return to an uninformed investor) to investors who accept
the contract if they have no signal or a good signal is
V = u[qD + (1 ¡ q)M] + (1 ¡ u)R ¡ [pD + (1 ¡ p)M],







(1 ¡ u)[R ¡ (1 ¡ q)D ¡ qM]. (13)
Participation constraints
The single contract has to be attractive to uninformed investors as well
as to informed investors when the signal is good. This leads to constraints
pD + (1 ¡ p)M ¡ R ¸ 0, (14)
qD + (1 ¡ q)M ¡ R ¸ 0. (15)
Wealth constraints
The banker as well as the investors have limited liability. This leads to
constraints
Y ¡ D ¸ 0, (16)
Y ¡ M ¸ 0, (17)
and
D ¸ 0, (18)









+ (1 ¡ q)[Y ¡ M]
o
+






+ q[Y ¡ M]
o
, (20)
subject to constraints (13) to (19).
Proposition 1 (The single contract) In a pooling equilibrium, the banker
















[R ¡ Y ] > 0. (23)
Proof. see appendix.
The single contract can be represented by a point in D-M-space as point
c in Figure 2. Its parameters are found by the following steps.:
1. The wealth constraints restrict the area of feasible solutions for fD;Mg





2. The three lines with negative slope, g, n, and b, are the P.C.s for
investors with a good signal, no signal, and a bad signal. They intersect
in fR;Rg, which represents the riskless asset. (Note that, under the




lies on the P.C. for
investors with a bad signal.) As q > p, only n, the P.C. for uninformed
19investors can bind. While b is never satis…ed, g is slack, since it lies
below n. Solutions must lie within the shaded area.
3. Among all points that satisfy the constraints, point c lies on line i,
the iso-pro…t line with the highest possible pro…t (the one closest to
the origin).16 In point c the banker leaves all income after failure to
depositors. This is because a still uninformed banker, in comparison to
an uninformed investor, has a stronger preference for D relative to M.
Both attach the same probabilities to success and failure, respectively;
yet, the banker bene…ts from an increase in M (along n) through the
correspondent reduction in the value of the signal.
[Figure 2 about here]
Under the single contract, as k > 0, there is excess monitoring. The




, but this would wipe
out her pro…ts. Since R ¡ Y > 0, pro…t maximizing k is positive. The
banker’s expected pro…t under the single contract is







[R ¡ Y ]
!2
; (24)
16Iso-pro…t lines have slope
@M=@D = ¡(@P=@D)=(@P=@M) =




[R ¡ (1 ¡ q)D ¡ qM],
and @2M=@D2 < 0:
20this is equal to the net project return (the pro…t under symmetric informa-
tion) minus an expression equal to V 2=S or kV . The latter amount is paid
to informed investors who (in addition to R) get an expected refund of infor-
mation expenditures (calculated on the basis of the highest relevant s = V ).
As a consequence, the banker pays kV=2 each as aggregate deadweight cost
of information and as information rent to investors with s < V .
It is evident from (24), that it is the lack of income when the project
fails (R ¡ Y > 0) that prevents the banker from implementing the social
optimum. We will see in section 3.5 that this constraint can be softened (but
not eliminated) by use of a separating contract.
3.5 The dual contract
To achieve a separating equilibrium, the banker o¤ers menu C0=fcj;csg with
two contracts. One contract appeals to uninformed investors, the other to in-
formed investors when the signal is good. (When the signal is bad, informed
investors buy the riskless asset.) We will call the contract for informed in-
vestors the junior contract, cj, and the contract for uninformed investors the
senior contract, cs. It will turn out that these contracts are in fact junior and
senior in the sense that the senior contract is served …rst in case of failure of
the project while the junior contract pays more when the project succeeds.
When there is more than one contract, parties may gain from contracting
on the structure of depositors, Á. This structure becomes known in case of
failure. Under the dual contract menu, there are potentially two groups of
21depositors, informed (junior) and uninformed (senior). As in reality, when a
bank fails after good news, all depositors are still there. When a bank fails
after bad news, uninformed depositors are likely to be alone, as they had
no chance to react, while informed investors may not have deposited their
money (or may have withdrawn it). The fractions of depositors after a good
signal are thus fj
g = k0, and fs
g = 1 ¡ k0, i.e. Á
0
g = fk0;1 ¡ k0g. After a bad
signal f
j
b = 0, and fs
b = 1, i.e. Á
0
b = f0;1g.
The elements of the dual contract menu can be written on the out-
come of the project and – in the case of failure – on Á
0: However, for
the junior contract, Á
0 is irrelevant. As the fraction of junior depositors
is zero after a bad signal, we have Á
0 = Á
0
g whenever there are junior de-













. The banker again looks for the contractual
payments that maximize her pro…t when individual investors behave ratio-
nally. The relevant constraints to this problem are similar to those under the
single contract:
Optimal information constraint





j + (1 ¡ q)M
j
i
+ (1 ¡ u)R ¡ [pD














=(1 ¡ p). Dividing by S









j + (1 ¡ q)M
j ¡ R
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+ [R ¡ pD





The senior contract must satisfy the participation constraint for unin-
formed investors, while the junior contract must satisfy the participation
constraint for investors with a good signal. Neither contract needs attract
investors with a bad signal (although the banker would not mind getting
their funds). This yields constraints:
pD
s + (1 ¡ p)EM
s ¡ R ¸ 0, (26)
qD
j + (1 ¡ q)M
j ¡ R ¸ 0. (27)
Incentive constraints
When the banker o¤ers more than one contract she has to make sure
that each category of investors prefer the contract designed for them. Unin-
formed investors are supposed to prefer the senior contract, whereas informed
investors, after a good signal, buy the junior contract. This leads to two self-




























An important di¤erence to the single contract arises with the banker’s
limited liability constraints. Wealth constraints are no longer identical across




j ¡ (1 ¡ k
0)D
s ¸ 0, (30)
23Y ¡ k
0M









After a bad signal there are (1 ¡ k0) senior depositors only; hence
(1 ¡ k
0)Y ¡ (1 ¡ k
0)D
s ¸ 0, (32)
(1 ¡ k




b) ¸ 0. (33)
Investors’ limited liability constraints are:
D
j ¸ 0, M
j ¸ 0, (34)
D










b) ¸ 0. (35)








































subject to (25) to (35).
Proposition 2 (The dual contract) A separating equilibrium has two con-
tracts: (1.) The junior contract, cj, pays Dj in case of success and nothing
in case of failure; (2.) the senior contract, cs, pays Ds < Dj in case of
success; in case of failure, senior depositors share the intermediary’s assets.









b). Contractual payments and the fraction of informed






































































Figure 3 illustrates the logic behind the dual contract:
1. The dual contract has a senior component, given by point cs, and
a junior component, cj: The senior contract is safer than the single
contract (represented by point c); the junior is more risky.
2. The senior contract (point cs) lies on line n, the P.C. for uninformed
investors. It lies above c as (in expected terms) the senior contract can
pay more than the single contract when the project fails (EMs > Y ).
Only when there are no junior depositors (i.e. after a bad signal), senior
depositors get exactly Y ; when there are junior depositors (after a
good signal) the return on their investment is distributed among senior
depositors. Senior depositors thus get an “add-on” to Y , the return
to uninformed depositors in case of failure under the single contract.
This add-on is determined by the expected ratio of junior to senior
25depositors in case of failure. Graphically this is the vertical distance
between EMs and Y . In formal terms it is u(1¡q)k0=(1¡p)(1 ¡ k0), the
(non-negative) fraction within parentheses in (42). The relative scarcity
of failure income (Y < R) that we found to cause excess monitoring
under the single contract is thus partially overcome by use of a dual
contract. Excess monitoring cannot be eliminated completely, though,
since with EMs getting closer to R a correspondent fall in k0 dries out
the very pool of junior deposits from which the di¤erence between EMs
and Y is fed.
3. The junior contract, represented by point cj, is situated on the inter-
section of line g0 with the D–axis. Line g0 is the I.C. for investors with
a good signal that runs through cs. It is a parallel to g, the P.C. for
investors with a good signal, since both constraints have an identical
rate of substitution ¡@Dj=@Mj = (1 ¡ q)=q. The junior contract, cj,
has to lie on (or to the right of) g0 to prevent investors with a good
signal from buying the senior contract.
[Figure 3 about here]
The dual contract achieves a reduction in the value of information and in
the degree of excess monitoring compared to the single contract. From (43)
and from EMs > Y it follows that k > k0 > 0, i.e. the fraction of investors
who get informed is smaller under the dual than under the single contract
(but still above its socially optimal value of zero). The dual contract thus
induces some investors who would get the signal under the single contract
26to do without it. These are investors with information cost s in a “middle”
range (V 0 < s < V ). Investors with low information cost (s < V 0) want the
signal even under the dual contract, while investors with high information
cost (V < s) always remain uninformed. The social return from the use of
two priority classes of debt is equal to the amount of information expenditure
saved by “luring” the middle category of investors into the uninformed camp.
From the dual contract, the banker gets expected pro…t
P











which is more than under the single contract, as EMs > Y . The banker gets
a higher expected amount of funding, plus she has to pay a smaller premium
to informed depositors to reimburse them for information expenditures.
Under the dual contract there are thus three claims on the banker’s termi-
nal assets: senior debt, junior debt, and equity, the banker’s claim on residual
income in case of success. It is important that the model yields three, rather
than two types of claims. A model with two types would only explain the
existence of debt and equity, but not the existence of senior and junior debt.
The dual contract is the (privately) optimal contract when borrowing
from uninformed investors maximizes the banker’s pro…ts. We have not yet
examined what contract the banker o¤ers when she gets a higher pro…t by
raising money from informed investors only.
273.6 The monitoring contract
If the banker only borrows from informed investors the contract menu has
only one item, as there is at most one category of depositors: after a good
signal, all ^ k informed investors lend, after a bad signal, nobody does. As
this contract only appeals to informed investors, we call it the monitoring
contract, ^ c = fD;Mg.17 Like under the single contract discussed above,
there is nothing to be gained from contracting on the structure of depositors:
The fraction of depositors holding the monitoring contract to total depositors
is ^ f = 1, whenever someone holds the contract at all.
Optimal information constraint
The value of the signal, ^ V , can again be derived as expected income of
an informed, minus expected income of an uninformed investor. Here, this is
equal to the probability u that the signal is good (which leads an informed
investor to buy the contract), multiplied by the expected gain from buying
the contract rather than the risk-less asset after a good signal. The number







u[qD + (1 ¡ q)M ¡ R]. (44)
Participation constraint
To make the contract attractive to investors with a good signal, payments
17To analyze this contract, we do not have to worry about the fact that this contract is
not o¤ered in the benchmark case where (1 ¡ q)Y + qY = R. We will look at the choice




more generally in section 3.7.
28must satisfy
qD + (1 ¡ q)M ¡ R ¸ 0. (45)
Incentive constraint
The contract should not be attractive to uninformed investors, hence
R ¡ pD + (1 ¡ p)M ¸ 0. (46)
Wealth constraints
There are wealth constraints analogous to those under the contracts ex-
amined above:
Y ¡ D ¸ 0, Y ¡ M ¸ 0. (47)
D ¸ 0, M ¸ 0. (48)
The banker solves
max






+ (1 ¡ q)[Y ¡ M]
o
,
subject to (44) to (48).
Proposition 3 (The monitoring contract) The optimal contract appeal-
ing to investors with a good signal only has payments D and M which jointly
solve




qY + (1 ¡ q)Y ¡ R
i
, (49)










29The monitoring contract is illustrated by Figure 4:
1. Solutions for the parameters of the optimal contract must lie within the
shaded area, i.e. between the W.C.s and between the P.C.s for investors
with a good signal, g, and for uninformed ones, n. However, none of
these constraints binds. Along g, pro…ts per dollar of investment are be
high, but the value of the signal, and hence the number of depositors,




the value of the signal and the expected
number of depositors, are high, but pro…ts per dollar are zero. The
banker’s problem, therefore, has a solution interior to the shaded area.
2. Any point on the solid section of line ^ g represents an optimal contract,
i.e. a pair of contractual payments fD;Mg that satis…es (49). The
monitoring contract is not uniquely de…ned:18 At one extreme (repre-
sented by the intersection of ^ g with the D-axis), depositors bear the
full risk of the project. At the other extreme (where M = Y ), depos-
itors bear the minimum amount of risk possible under the monitoring
contract. The latter case seems to be more relevant if one assumes that
investors are more likely to exhibit some aversion to risk.
3. While realized returns can be shared according to any contract repre-
sented on the solid section of ^ g, expected returns are shared according
to a clear rule. First, depositors get an expected return of R (condi-
18With only one group of depositors whose state of knowledge is known ex ante, the
Modigliany & Miller (1958, 1963) irrelevance theorems apply (along the solid section of
^ g).
30tional on a good signal) to ensure participation. Second, the remaining
net expected return is shared …fty-…fty between the banker and deposi-




.19 While g represents an expected return (after a good signal)




represents the full expected project
return. Along ^ g each party gets half the net expected return of the
project (conditional on a good signal), Eg (Y ) ¡ R.
[Figure 4 about here]
The monitoring contract stimulates information acquisition by investors
and attracts those who get a good signal. It is used whenever a borrower
has an interest to be monitored (like venture capital …rms). Expected pro…t















qY + (1 ¡ q)Y ¡ R
i2
.
^ P may be smaller or bigger than the pro…t from the dual contract. It depends
on project parameters whether it pays the banker to attract uninformed
investors or not.
3.7 Contract regions
We now turn to the question, which contract the banker chooses for di¤erent




given p, q, and S. To answer this question
19Line ^ g is parallel to g because the rates of substitution between D and M in (45) and
in (49) are the same.
31we relax our benchmark assumption (2) that the project breaks even after a
bad signal and examine a more general case only restricted by Y > Y and




can now lie anywhere to the right of the
45±-line between the D–axis and its parallel through R.
[Figure 5 about here]





For each region we examine the decision of a banker maximizing her pro…t






lies below g, all funds should be invested in the riskless asset
(I¤
Y = 0; I¤
R = 1 ), whatever the signal. The banker cannot o¤er any





lies between g and n, all funds should be invested in the
project if the signal is good (i.e. I¤
Y g = 1; I¤
Rg = 0) and in the riskless
asset if it is bad (I¤
Y b = 0; I¤
Rb = 1). The banker o¤ers the monitoring
contract. Information expenditure is ^ k > 0, and investment in the
20Under the more general assumptions, optimal contract parameters basically do not
change, as constraints remain the same. However, pro…t under the dual contract, becomes






















Under our benchmark case, the term on the second line was zero; this leads to the formula
for P0 in the text.
32project is IY g = k < I¤
Y g, and IY b = 0 = I¤
Y b, respectively. There is





lies between n and b, the same socially optimal strategy as
under (2.) applies. One would expect the banker to o¤er the dual
contract. The dual contract leads to k0 > 0 and investment policies
IY g = 1 = I¤
Y g, and IY b = 1 ¡ k0 > I¤
Y b, i.e. to overinvestment after a
bad signal.
However, in a part of this region, the monitoring contract is more prof-





marginally above n.21 The borderline between the two contracts is
given by line z (the locus of equality of pro…ts). Line z is convex and
runs through fR;Rg (where all contracts become identical). It inter-
sects the horizontal axis to the left of R=(1 ¡ q).22
As Figure 5 shows, the banker is likely to prefer the monitoring con-
tract over the dual contract, when the project pays well after success
but little after failure. This …ts well with what one observes in prac-
tice: Investment, or venture capital …rms (high Y , low Y ) typically
borrow from a small number of informed investors only, whereas banks
(Y and Y relatively close to R) borrow from a large number of mostly
uninformed depositors. Besides, transparency favours the monitoring
21The dual contract in this case leaves the banker with an expected pro…t close to zero.
22More precisely, by comparison of the monitoring and the single contract (which on the
horizontal axis becomes identical to the dual contract) line z can be shown to intersect
the horizontal axis to the left of R(2q ¡ p)=pq < R=(1 ¡ q).
33contract, while opaqueness favours dual debt: The lower S, the more
line z bends to the right, as pro…ts under the monitoring contract de-





lies above b, all funds should be invested in the project what-
ever the signal, i.e. I¤
Y = 1; I¤
R = 0. (Our benchmark case used
above was a borderline example to this region.) The banker o¤ers the




, investment policies being
IY g = 1 = I¤
Y g, and IY b = 1 ¡ k0 < I¤
Y b = 1. In this region the dual
contract leads to underinvestment after a bad signal.
The banker could a¤ord o¤ering a contract that sets the value of in-
formation and the fraction of informed investors k to 0 = k¤: Such a
non-monitoring contract is a uniform contract, as there is only one cat-
egory of investors. It is similar to the single contract discussed above,
but satis…es b instead of n. Contractual payments are M = Y , and
D = R=(1 ¡ q) + Y q=(1 ¡ q). This non-monitoring contract is hardly
of any practical relevance, as the banker only prefers it to the dual




lies relatively far to the right of b.24
23This is another reason why banks would use dual class debt. On the opaqueness of
banks see Morgan (1999).




is located to the right of a parallel to n that intersects the horizontal axis at R=(1 ¡ q).
344 The rationale of dual class debt and of legal
priority
Our model suggests a particular rationale for dual class debt. Dual debt
becomes relevant whenever a borrower attracts informed and uninformed
lenders. Contrary to what some authors (e.g. Benston & al., 1986, pp.179,
193; White, 1991, p.237) suggest,25 the purpose of dual class debt is not to
provide monitoring incentives. The purpose of dual class debt is to reduce
excessive monitoring. The senior contract leads some investors who would
monitor under the single contract to stay uninformed. The junior contract
(subordinated debt) does not provide any monitoring incentives: Investors
who select the junior contract would become monitors even under the sin-
gle contract. When a borrower seeks to provide monitoring incentives, a
monitoring contract is called for. Such a contract induces some investors to
buy a signal who would otherwise go uninformed. A monitoring contract is
chosen when a borrower maximizes pro…ts by raising funds from (favorably)
25To be precise, the suggestion that subordinated debt strengthens market discipline for
banks can have at least three di¤erent meanings, namely:
(1.) Yield spreads on subordinated debt re‡ect bank risk;
(2.) A regulatory minimum to the share of subordinated debt in total liabilities (or a
ceiling on its yield) leads banks to take less risk;
(3.) The funding of a …rm by dual, rather than single class debt, reduces monitoring
incentives.
In this article we …nd support to the third statement; we have not attempted to deal
with any of the other two.
35informed investors only.
According to these …ndings, the use of dual class debt seems to be par-
ticularly attractive for banks. Banks are characterized by a large number
of lenders, and most of these are not very sophisticated monitors.26 A vast
majority of depositors with retail banks hold relatively small balances and
thus have high monitoring cost per dollar of deposit. In the US, 86 percent
of all deposits have balances below 25,000 US$. In Switzerland, 88 percent
of savings deposits have balances below 30,000 Sfr. (about 20,000 US$).27
Monitoring by these depositors would in most cases be socially wasteful. Se-
niority for their deposits make these relatively safe claims concentrates the
incentive to monitor with larger and more sophisticated junior lenders.
The large number of bank depositors also calls for some standardization
of contracts. This may explain why retail banks in reality, like in our model,
pre-announce a menu of a limited number of deposit contract types. These
contracts are o¤ered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and are not negotiated. In
contrast, investment banks and their corporate or institutional customers,
who are small in numbers and relatively knowledgeable, typically bargain
very hard over tailor-made contracts.28
26This “de…nition” of a bank follows Dewatripont & Tirole (1994) who “consider banks
as regular …rms except for the fact that their debtholders are small and dispersed and thus
need to be represented” (p. 117f.).
27see Kennickel et al. (1996), table 4, row 5, column 5, and Banque Nationale Suisse
(1998), table 20.4-5.
28The importance of standardized contracts for economic growth is analyzed in Sussman
(1999).
36There are several reasons why standardized priority rules are often de…ned
in the law. Standardization by law treats all depositors of all banks alike;
depositors do not have to read …rm speci…c small print. A legal de…nition
of priorities also protects existing senior depositors against the future issue
of debt instruments with a higher priority.29 In the absence of legal priority
classes, a depositor would need to know not only his own contract, but also
the priority provisions in all other contracts with the same borrower. Legal
priority classes also save bargaining costs; in the absence of legal classes,
the issue of a new claim with seniority would require negotiations with all
existing holders of claims to be made junior.30 Legal standardization also
avoids inconsistencies among priority promises made to di¤erent lenders, and
it reduces the risk that priority arrangements are challenged in court. The
bene…ts of legally standardized priority rules for …rms with a large number
of lenders, like banks, quite likely outweigh the cost of “a few sizes …t all”.
This view is in line with Dewatripont & Tirole (1994) who make “a case for
banking regulation as performing a monitoring service in screening, auditing,
covenant writing, and intervention activities that depositors are unable or
unwilling to do for themselves” (p. 6, our emphasis).
29In practice, legal priority rules can be complemented (or circumvented) by collater-
alization. Collateralization may be considered the tailor-made version of priority; legal
priority being the standardized version.
30In contrast to seniority, the juniority of a new claim can be established by a bilateral
agreement. This is, because the holders of senior debt do not su¤er (but in fact bene…t)
from the issue of further junior debt and thus do not have to be consulted. Subordinate
debt is regularly issued by banks in many countries on the basis of bilateral agreements.
37Finally, a legal de…nition of deposit priority rules may be necessary to pro-
tect the deposit insurance fund. Pro…t maximizing banks have an interest to
make non-insured liabilities senior to insured deposits (e.g. through collat-
eralization or repurchase agreements) unless insurance premia are adjusted
accordingly. To prevent an exploitation of the insurance fund, legislators
may be keen to put insured deposits into the highest priority class.
5 Conclusions
The presented model explains why borrowers may o¤er menus of debt instru-
ments that di¤er with respect to priority in bankruptcy. When information
costs di¤er among investors and are unobservable to the borrower, a contract
menu o¤ering junior and senior debt can reduce socially wasteful information
gathering. Such dual class debt should be expected to occur whenever a bor-
rower raises funds from a large number of partially small, unsophisticated, or
very short term lenders. The typical …rm that …ts this description is a bank.
Not only may banks have an incentive to issue debt with di¤erent priority
status (like deposits versus non-deposit liabilities, or standard versus subor-
dinated debt); there are also a number of reasons why priority provisions
are often set by the legislator, rather than being left to private parties. The
larger the number of lenders, the more substantial is the reduction in trans-
action cost achieved by standardization. The arguments in favour of a legal
standardization of bankruptcy priorities are thus particularly strong in the
case of bank deposits which are typically held by a large number of investors.
38Our model lends some support to the view that bankruptcy priority rules
for bank deposits may not be (just another) costly government intervention
but rather a substitute for bilateral contracts too costly to write for private
parties.
Many aspects of deposit priority rules, in particular their joint e¤ects
with deposit insurance, may need further investigation. Yet, in the light of
our model it is not surprising that priority for bank deposits exists in several
countries and has recently been rediscovered by others, including the US.
39Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the proposition in three steps. First,
we show that under the single contract c =fD;Mg among (a) the P.C. for
uninformed investors, and (b) the wealth constraint M · Y , at least one must
bind. We use the fact, all contracts fD;Mg on a line with slope ¡@M=@D =
(1 ¡ q)=q (the slope of the P.C. for investors with a bad signal) have the




(1 ¡ u)[R ¡ (1 ¡ q)D ¡ qM].
Along any such line, the banker’s pro…ts decrease in D and increase in M
(the banker who has no signal yet is more optimistic than investors with
a bad signal). More precisely, a decrease of D by ²q and a corresponding
increase of M by ²(1 ¡ q) increase pro…ts by 2²uq. Hence, at least one of the
two constraints mentioned must bind.
Second, we show that the P.C. for uninformed investors must bind even if
M = Y binds. We dosoby provingthat the single contract c =fR=p ¡ (1 ¡ p)Y =p; Y g
is the most pro…table among all contracts with fD;Y g. A change of D along
M = Y changes pro…ts by
@P
@ (D j M = Y )


















(1 ¡ q)[R ¡ Y ].
As pS > u(q ¡ p)[R ¡ Y ] by assumption, and 2(q ¡ p)(1 ¡ q) < p for all
admissible values of p and q, it follows that B < p. As (1 ¡ u) > 0, and
40(1 ¡ q) > 0, it follows that
@P
@ (D j M = Y )
< 0.
i.e. the P.C. for uninformed investors binds.
Third, we show that M · Y binds, even if the P.C. for uninformed
investor binds. We rewrite the banker’s problem by substituting for D from











which is equivalent to maxM: Therefore M · Y binds.
As at least one of the two constraints binds and as one binds if the other
does, it follows that both bind. This yields the single contract.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we show that the introduction of a sec-
ond contract, in addition to the single contract, increases pro…ts. Then we
show that pro…ts are maximized when the single contract becomes the senior
contract, while the other contract becomes the junior contract.
We start from a contract c± which in the beginning is identical to the
single contract, i.e. c± = c. Suppose that, in addition to c±, the banker o¤ers
a second contract cg = fDg;Mgg. To make it just attractive to investors with
a good signal, she sets Mg = 0, and Dg = R=p¡Y (q ¡ p)=pq. This puts cg
on a line through c± with slope ¡@Mg=@Dg = q=(1 ¡ q). The introduction of
cg increases pro…ts; in fact, cg is the most pro…table among all contracts that
lie on the I.C. for investors with a good signal through c±. This is because the
41banker’s iso-pro…t line implies a substitution rate ¡@Mg=@Dg < q=(1 ¡ q).
(The banker who does not yet know the signal is more pessimistic than an
investor with a good signal will be and pays these with success income.)
Next, we compare the menu fc±;cgg to contracts that have the same





g + (1 ¡ q)0 ¡ R] + [R ¡ pD
± ¡ (1 ¡ p)M
±]g
is a function of the two P.C.s, it does not change when either c± is moved
along the P.C. for uninformed investors (the second term in brackets), or cg
along the P.C. for investors with a good signal (the …rst term in brackets).
In the presence of contract cg, contract c± can pay M± > M = Y , as
some failure returns become available to the holders of c±: It follows from
the proof of Proposition 1 that P (c±) > P (c). Further, as D± < D, Dg
can be made smaller than its initial value Dg = R=p¡Y (q ¡ p)=pq without
inducing investors with a good signal to switch to c±. It is easy to see that,
for two reasons, smaller Dg means higher expected pro…t. Lower Dg means
a smaller payment per (informed) investor, as well as a lower value of the
signal and thus a smaller fraction of informed investors (who may get a bad
signal and not lend to the bank). Therefore, optimal cg is de…ned by an I.C.
that restricts Dg from below.
As optimal c± is de…ned by the P.C. for uninformed investors and the
wealth constraint on Y , while optimal cg is de…ned by an I.C. and by non-
negativity of Mg, the contract pair fc±;cgg in the optimum is identical to
the dual contract described in Proposition 2.
42Proof of Proposition 3. Under the monitoring contract, the banker’s

















qY + (1 ¡ q)Y ¡ R
i
¡ 2[qD + (1 ¡ q)M ¡ R].
As @=@D and @=@M are linearly dependent, they yield only one F.O.C. Pro…t
maximization requires C = 0, which implies




qY + (1 ¡ q)Y ¡ R
i
,
as stated in Proposition 3. As the right-hand side is clearly positive, the P.C.
for investors (with a good signal) on the left-hand side cannot bind. Nor can




or f0;Y g. Only one of the
wealth constraints D · Y , M · Y , or M ¸ 0 could bind at one time (
D ¸ 0 can never bind). But, as iso-pro…t lines and the P.C. have identical
slope ¡@M=@D = q=(1 ¡ q), there is always a solution to ^ c for which no
constraint binds (except in the trivial case where qY + (1 ¡ q)Y ¡ R = 0).
Any solution to C = 0 is an optimal monitoring contract.
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